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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

The determination of taxable income derived from the operation of a foreign
branch by an American corporation is presented in a novel manner in the case
of Frederick Vietor and Achelis v. Salt's Textile Manufacturing Company in the
United States district court, Connecticut district. The Salt's Textile Manu
facturing Company’s branch in France earned a profit in the year 1919, if its
income was measured in francs without consideration of the depreciation of the
value of the francs in terms of United States dollars, but sustained a loss when
the depreciation was taken into consideration.
This case presents very interesting features to accountants and we recom
mend a careful reading of the decision to those whose practice brings them in
contact with features of exchange values of money. The court’s decision is
briefly stated as follows:

“ The loss from operations in a foreign country was computed by taking
the difference between the net current assets of the foreign branch at the
beginning of the year, expressed in terms of United States money, and the
net current assets of such branch at the end of the year, expressed in
terms of United States money, thus rejecting the government’s method of
computing the profit in foreign money, and converting such profit into
United States money at the close of the year.”

This decision seems to open up the somewhat abstruse question of what is
income. The receiver's (of the Salt’s Textile Manufacturing Company) con
tention as stated by the court, “involves an exegesis to that part of the statute
which attempts to determine income; while that of the government is an at
tempt to apply the provisions relating to allowable deductions.”
It is apparent that the government followed the classic methods of account
ing in an endeavor to determine the net income “realized,” whereas the re
ceiver interprets net income or loss upon the basis of the decrease of value of
assets occurring within the year, a method which, if generally followed, would
lead far afield and involve the inclusion in income of unearned increment (a
term dear to the hearts of the Henry George cult of economists) or unrealized
profits, were there an increase shown by such method, as it would seem to
comprehend the element of the fluctuation of value of money as measured by its
purchasing power. These comments touch but a few of the considerations that
arise from the court’s ruling, and we believe the subject matter and the con
clusions of this case will be of absorbing interest to all accountants.
Another decision of major importance is that of Justice F. L. Siddons of the
supreme court of the District of Columbia in the case of The United States ex rel.
James S. McCandless v. The United States Board of Tax Appeals. In this case
“a mandamus was issued to compel the board to enter the findings of fact and
decision of a division as that of the board in the case of a review by the entire
board where the taxpayer was given no opportunity to be heard ” (by the entire
board) “and where there was no specific action by the chairman directing that
this particular decision should be reviewed.”
It appears from a reading of the court’s decision that the taxpayer’s case was
heard by a division of the board and that the division sustained the position of
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the taxpayer, but he was not notified of the decision of the division. The
decision was later reviewed by the entire board as a matter of consistent policy
of the board but not in conformity with subsection 1 of section 900, which
provides

"A division shall hear and determine appeals filed with the board and
assigned to such division by the chairman. Upon the expiration of thirty
days after a decision by a division, such decision and the findings of fact
made in connection therewith, shall become the final decision and findings
of the board, unless within such period the chairman has directed that such
decision shall be reviewed by the board.”
It appears that division No. 3 was assigned to hear the appeal; that it had
such hearing, and that under date of November 26, 1925, sustained the tax
payer’s contentions. Furthermore, it appears that the taxpayer was not
furnished with a copy of the division’s findings and its decision (in fact his
application for such copy was refused) and that the entire board, without giving
notice to the taxpayer, proceeded to give consideration to the findings and
decision of division No. 3.
The entire board reversed the decision of division No. 3, and the taxpayer
was notified only of this final decision. It is apparent from a reading of this
case that the mandamus was issued because the methods of the board did not
conform to the methods prescribed by the statute in the following particulars:
1. The findings of fact and decision were not made by a board that had heard
the taxpayer’s appeal.
2. The case was reviewed without specific direction of the chairman.
3. The taxpayer was not notified of the findings and decision by division No.
3, nor of the fact that his case was to be reviewed by the entire board.
It is not clear from what appears in the court’s decision that the thirty days’
period for direction of the review of a division’s findings and decision had been
exceeded.
When one recalls with what punctiliousness the board regards the law as to
its jurisdiction and the sixty-day period in which an appeal must be delivered to
it, it is cause for wonder when the board adopts rules for its functioning that
are, apparently, at variance with the law controlling its activities.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS

Requirement that petition to board of tax appeals shall be filed within sixty
days after the mailing of a deficiency notice was not met where envelope con
taining petition was placed in the slot of the door of the room where mail
addressed to the board was usually delivered, after the board’s office had been
closed conformably with its published rules. (Court of appeals of the District
of Columbia, Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. David H. Blair, commissioner.)
Gain or loss resulting from sale during 1920, 1921 and 1922 of stock acquired
during 1920 by a residuary legatee should be computed upon the basis of the
fair market value of stock at the time of the distribution and not at the time of
the testator’s death, nor when the new certificates were actually delivered.
(U. S. district court, W. D. New York, E. Franklin Brewster v. Bert Gage,
collector.)
Judgment against a suspended or defunct corporation is not a condition
precedent to a suit in equity against the directors or stockholders to whom there
has been distributed the property of the corporation. (U. S. district court,
S. D. California, S. D.; U. S. William P. and Jane D. Pann and Helen Donald.)
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Six-year period of collection provided in 1924 act held applicable where a
timely assessment was made prior to the passage of the act, and collection was
not barred on June 2, 1924, date of the passage of the act. (U. S. district court,
S. D. California, S. D.; U. S. v. William P. and Jane D. Pann and Helen
Donald.)
Federal estate tax, act of 1918, held unconstitutional as being a direct tax
unapportioned in so far as it taxes the dower interest of a widow, or the estate
accepted in lieu of dower, passing by operation of the laws of the state of
Missouri. (U. S. district court, St. Joseph division of W. D. of Missouri;
Mary Z. Hibbard, administratrix, v. Noah Crooks, collector.)
A lessor is not taxable on the amount of federal income tax paid by a lessee of
its properties on the rental income received by such lessor under a lease provid
ing for the payment of all taxes by the lessee. (U. S. district court, Massa
chusetts; Boston and Maine Railroad v. United States.)
Instruments were held to be bonds of indebtedness within the meaning of
schedule A-1, title VIII, act of 1924, where containing a promise under seal, to
pay a sum certain, incorporating by reference the terms of the mortgage given
to secure their payment and issued in series by the corporation and designated
for use as corporate securities. (U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania;
Bellfied Company v. D. B. Heiner, collector.)
The mere grant of a corporate charter in 1918 and the occasional use of the
corporate name did not make a business corporate in law, where it is established
by evidence that the business and the income therefrom did not belong to the
corporation and the activities of such business were carried on in a partnership
relation. Such corporation was held to have no income in 1919, and a suit
under the trust fund doctrine against the stockholders of the dissolved corpora
tion for taxes assessed against it was dismissed. (U. S. district court, Mary
land; United States v. 5. V. Jenlenko and D. G. Rosenstock.)
Where a subsidiary, keeping books on a calendar-year basis, of a corporation
keeping books on a fiscal year basis, filed an income tax for 1917 in accordance
with its books, and the parent corporation filed a consolidated excess-profits tax
return for the period from January 1, 1917, to June 30,1917, in accordance with
its books, the commissioner has no authority to determine the 1917 net income
of the subsidiary for any other taxable period than the entire calendar year
1917. (U. S. court of claims, Clinchfield Navigation Co., Inc. v. United
States.)
Amounts paid through the delivery of coal at less than market price for the
construction on the taxpayer’s property of a branch line of railroad, thus giving
the taxpayer railroad connections, may be included in invested capital.
(U. S. circuit court of appeals; Ganley Mountain Coal Company v. Commis
sioner.)
The value of property transferred by the decedent in 1917 to trustees with
full power and authority to deal with the same, to pay income thereof to the
grantor’s husband for life and after his death to the settlor, and after her death
to distribute the corpus thereof, is properly included in the gross estate of the
decedent as property intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or
after her death. (U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania; Walter A. May et
al., executors, v. D. B. Heiner, collector.)
Royalties received, pursuant to a ten-year contract for production of phono
graph records, during 1917 by a noted singer, on account of sales made during
1917 of records which had been produced prior to 1917, held subject to excess
profits tax, sec. 209, act of 1917. (U. S. district court, S. D. New York; Alma
Gluck Zimbalist v. Charles W. Anderson.)
Taxes paid in order to avoid penalties and threatened seizure of property by
distraint after their collection had been barred by statue of limitations may be
recovered. Sec. 1106 (a), act of 1926, was not intended to defeat recovery by
taxpayer in such a situation. (U. S. district court, Massachusetts; Aroline C.
Gove v. Malcolm E. Nichols, collector.)
A trustee in bankruptcy, having secured by his own motion an order from the
referee fixing the amount of excise taxes payable for period from December,
1919, to January, 1922, inclusive, may not later reopen the case where no
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allegations are made of fraud, accident or mistake in making the original order.
(U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania; In re Universal Rubber Products
Company, bankrupt.)
A court has no power to enjoin the collection of a tax barred by the statute of
limitations. Sec. 274 (a) act of 1926, permitting injunction pending an inquiry
before the board of tax appeals extends only to the collection of a “ deficiency ”
as defined by sec. 273, act of 1926, and is not applicable when no deficiency is
asserted, in a case where the amount claimed by the government does not
exceed amount shown to be due on the return though such amount was qualified
by a simultaneous request for special assessment under secs. 327 and 328
(acts of 1918 and 1921), but without a substitute computation on the basis of
such requested special assessment. (U. S. district court, N. D. Georgia,
Atlanta; Peerless Woolen Mills v. J. T. Rose, collector.)
Deduction for federal estate tax may be made by an estate keeping its ac
counts on a cash receipts and disbursements basis only in the taxable year or
years in which actually paid. (U. S. court of claims, Fourth and Central Trust
Co. surviving executor, v. U. S.)
Building expert retained by board of local improvements, Chicago, in con
nection with valuation of buildings affected by certain local improvements, held
not an officer or employee of a state or subdivision thereof, and, therefore,
income received during 1920 and 1921 from such services is taxable. (U. S.
court of claims; Frank H. Mesce v. United States.)
The lien of the United States for income taxes due from mortgager, is sub
ordinate to the lien of the mortgage which was properly executed and recorded
prior to the recording of the notice of tax lien. (U. S. district court, S. D.
Florida; A. A. Ormsbee et al. v. United States.)
Dividends received in 1917 (declared by the corporation to be payable out of
1916 earnings) held taxable to the recipients at 1917 rates to the extent of the
amount of the net profits of the corporation earned in 1917 prior to the date of
the payment, the net profits for such period being determined by prorating the
total profits earned during the entire year 1917. (U. S. court of claims; George
D. Horst v. U. S.)
Bondholder owning bonds containing a tax-free covenant clause held not
required to include in gross income for 1917 the amount of the 2% tax which
debtor corporation paid to the government. (U. S. court of claims; George D.
Horst v. U. S.)
A waiver filed by an executrix was held sufficient within the meaning of sec.
281 (e), act of 1924, to extend the time for filing claim for refund of taxes paid
by the deceased taxpayer. (U. S. court of claims; Mary S. Aldridge, executrix,
v. U. S.)
An agreement signed by an executor in regard to the property and the value
thereof to be used in determining the estate tax was held not to be a compromise
within rev. stat. sec. 3229, and not to bar suit by the executor for the recovery
of estate taxes paid. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, first circuit; Robert M.
Leach, executor, v. Malcolm E. Nichols, collector.)
The creator of an irrevocable trust was held not to be taxable upon the income
received by the trustee from the trust property and payable to the husband of
the creator of the trust for the benefit of their children. (U. S. district court,
Connecticut; Jane B. O'Malley Keyes v. Robert 0. Eaton, collector.)
The loss from operations in a foreign country was computed by taking the
difference between the net current assets of the foreign branch at the beginning
of the year, expressed in terms of United States money, and the net current
assets of such branch at the end of the year, expressed in United States money,
thus rejecting the government’s method of computing the profit or loss in
foreign money, and converting such profit into United States money at the
close of the year. (U. S. district court, Connecticut; Frederick Victor and
Achelis, et al., v. Salt’s Textile Manufacturing Company.)
No loss can be taken on francs segregated from the business and set aside for
financing a new enterprise, until these francs are converted into dollars by an
actual exchange. (U. S. district court, Connecticut; Frederick Victor and
Achelis v. Salt’s Textile Manufacturing Company.)
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No credit can be taken under sec, 238, act of 1918, for income and excess
profits taxes paid to France where from the viewpoint of dollar value, there was
no income, but there was an income from the viewpoint of franc value. (U. S.
district court, Connecticut; Frederick Vietor and Achelis v. Salt's Textile Manu
facturing Company.)
Stockholders of a dissolved corporation were held liable for their contributory
share of the corporation tax in the proportion which the stock held by them bore
to the whole capital stock, where suit not against all stockholders. (U. S.
district court, New York district; U. S. v. E. H. Garcia et al.)
While assessments made against a corporation are probably not prima facie
evidence of the amount due from stockholders after dissolution, admissions and
concessions of the corporate officers are admissible. (U. S. district court, New
York district; U. S. v. E. H. Garcia et al.)
The circumstances under which stock of a corporation was sold on a stock
exchange, taking into consideration the company’s property, goodwill and
strategic position and the evidence of those most familiar with the property and
most competent to estimate its value, were held sufficient to support a finding
of the fair market value of the stock different from the price at which sold on the
stock exchange. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, third circuit; D. B. Heiner,
collector, v. Minnie F. Byles Crosby et al.)
The date of payment of a dividend and not the date of declaration is the date
of distribution, and dividends declared in 1916 and 1917 and paid in 1917 are
taxable at the 1916 or 1917 rates depending upon profits accumulated prior to
date of payment. (Circuit court of appeals, third circuit; U. S. v. B. D.
Phillips.)
Invested capital was reduced after January 25, 1918, by a dividend declared
on that date, payable in cash or notes at the convenience of the company, the
dividend being paid partly in cash and partly in notes. (U. S. district court,
W. D. Pennsylvania; Logan-Gregg Hardware Company v. D. B. Heiner.)
The collection of a tax barred by the statute of limitations may be enjoined,
for sec. 1106 (a), act of 1926, extinguishes the liability in such case and hence
rev. stat. sec. 3224 does not operate. (Supreme court of the District of Colum
bia; Edward P. Mertz v. Secretary of the Treasury.)
The cost of opening two shafts in a coal mine is amortizable under sec. 234
(a) (8), act of 1918, for it was not intended to restrict the meaning of “ facilities ”
by the preceding words “buildings, machinery, equipment,” but rather to
enlarge it to take in anything and everything contributing to the general result
of winning the war. (Circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit; U. S. v. Corona
Coal Company.)
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